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Introduction
The expected utility (EU) model of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and the subjective
expected utility model (SEU) of Savage (1954) have been the central frameworks for the analysis of
choice under risk and uncertainty.  These models have been successful not only because of their
compelling axiomatic foundations and ability to describe economic choices, but also for the purely
practical reason that their mathematical structure facilitates analysis.
Despite obvious strengths, however, the EU and SEU models have some serious weaknesses.
Most critically, studies using both experimental and "real world" evidence have repeatedly found that
individuals often do not behave in a manner consistent with these models.  The paradoxical choices
identified by Allais and Ellsberg are pervasive.  If the EU models are not representative of the way
that private individuals and policy makers make decisions, then it is important for economists to ask
whether -- or at least in what circumstances -- our basic paradigm should be retained.  The purpose of
this paper will be to ask whether the failings of the EU models are relevant to applied economic
analysis.  I suggest that they are.
I begin by briefly presenting the EU and SEU models and discussing the systematic and
overwhelming evidence of violations of the models' predictions.  I then present two of the leading
alternative models that are vying to replace the EU models and show that these alternatives can be
fruitfully used in applied settings.  I close with suggestions of how applied economic analysis, both
positive and normative, should proceed in light of the evidence.
Overview of the EU and SEU models and the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes
The EU and SEU models both hold that choices are made so as to maximize the expected
value of an individual's utility, say,2
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where U(￿) is the individual's utility function, xi is a vector of goods in the i
th state of the world and pi
is the probability that the i
th state of the world will actually occur.  The EU formulation of von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) assumes that the probability vector p is known a priori by the
decision maker.  The SEU formulation of Savage (1954) makes no assumptions about the knowledge
of p, but instead shows that if a decision maker abides by a set of axioms she will behave as if she
has a set of personal or subjective probabilities.  While it does not follow from the axioms of either
Savage or von Neumann and Morgenstern, agents are typically assumed to be risk averse, i.e., that
the utility function is concave.
Violations of the EU and SEU models have been identified by many researchers including
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Loomes and Sugden (1979) and others.
2   In this paper I focus on
two problems -- the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes.  I give these two problems particular attention
because it is where the largest body of research has been conducted and where the possibilities for
improving applied economic analysis seem to be the greatest.
Due to the independence axiom, both EU and SEU hold that an individual's wellbeing is linear
in the probabilities.  In effect, they assume that individuals do not have preferences over probabilities
themselves, only over the outcomes that result.  The limitation of this structure is explained by Yaari
(1987):
In expected utility theory, the agent's attitude towards risk and the agent's attitude
towards wealth are forever bonded together.  [However,] at the level of fundamental
principles, risk aversion and diminishing marginal utility of wealth, which are
synonymous under expected utility theory, are horses of different colors. (p. 95)
In a series of pathbreaking experiments, Allais (1953) showed that a basic axiomatic assumption of
the EU models -- that utility is linear in the probabilities -- is false.  Accordingly, the fact that
decision makers frequently violate the independence axiom is known as Allais' (1953) paradox.3
The second problem that I wish to highlight is that there is no room in the EU models for true
ambiguity
3 or uncertainty about the probabilities in (1).  The Bayesian approach implicit in the EU
models assumes that any uncertainty over the probability distribution, p, can be expressed as second-
order probability distributions which can be used to define a final probability distribution, say p'.
Experimental evidence has found that decisions are not always made in this manner.  Camerer and
Weber (1992 p. 326) describe the problem here as follows: Suppose you flip a coin 1000 times and
get 500 heads.  Then take a second coin and flip it twice yielding one head and one tail.
Many people … prefer to bet on the first coin, because they are more confident or certain
that the first coin is fair.  Ambiguity about probability creates a kind of risk in betting on
the second coin – the risk of having the wrong belief.  SEU effectively requires that
decision makers be indifferent towards such a risk.
The fact that individuals systematically show a preference for well-defined probabilities was first
shown experimentally by Ellsberg (1961) but the notion of ambiguity as distinct from risk is closely
related to Knight (1921) and Shackle (1952, 1969).
Experimental evidence of violations of EU and SEU
The problems discussed above have led to an entire literature of experimental economics
concerned with evaluating when and how the EU models fail and succeed.  I will not attempt even a
superficial review of the experimental findings as thorough reviews are available elsewhere.
4  Suffice
it to say that experimental economists have shown that they are quite adept at developing situations
that will cause people to violate the EU models.  Experiments that follow from the work of Allais
have identified a number of important tendencies.  The EU model tends predict behavior quite well
when the decision problem involves probabilities in the "mid-range"; however, "nonlinear weighting
of small probabilities is empirically important in explaining choice behavior" (Harless and Camerer
1994, p. 1285).  The EU model is also not very good at explaining choices when individuals are
faced with losses as well as gains (Quiggin 1993 p. 140).4
Two trends are evident in experimental work focusing on ambiguity: the distinction between
ambiguity and risk  and the degree of ambiguity aversion.  In reviewing the literature, Camerer, Colin
and Weber (1992) find no correlation between risk attitudes and ambiguity attitudes and "substantial
premiums to avoid ambiguity – around 10% to 20% of expected value or expected probability" (p.
340).  Ambiguity, therefore, is found to be separate from risk and economically important.
The experimental results, therefore, provide overwhelming support for the proposition that
the EU models can not describe all behavior of economic agents. Where we go from here, however,
is not transparent.  There have been two principal responses to this experimental evidence.  The first
is to treat the results as "phenomena" instead of "paradoxes" (Howard 1992) which require no more
of a re-evaluation of the EU models than people's confusion by optical illusions require us to invent
new notions of distance (Varian 1992, p. 194).  The second response has been to look for alternatives
to the EU models that can explain the behavioral patterns found in the experimental work, yet retain
much of the appeal of the EU models.
Alternatives to the EU models
It seems that for every pattern that has been observed in the experimental data a theoretical
model has been developed that would explain the results.  For many of these models axioms have
been identified that, in some sense, rationalize choices that follow from the model.  In this section I
present two models which seem particularly promising.  Both retain much of the structure of the EU
framework, yet are able to explain more of the experimental evidence.
5
The RDEU model.  The rank dependent expected utility model (RDEU) was originally proposed by
Quiggin (1982), has also been explored by Yaari (1984) and is closely related to the models of
Schmeidler (1989) Gilboa (1987).  Developed to explain the Allais paradox, the RDEU model allows
probabilities to enter nonlinearly into an individual's objective function.  Because it preserves first-5
order stochastic dominance, Machina (1994, p. 1237) calls RDEU the first "successful" model with
nonlinear probabilities.
The RDEU model (presented in depth in Quiggin 1993), is typically applied in problems with
well-defined probabilities.
6  Following Quiggin (1993), the RDEU model is most easily presented in
terms of a lottery in which there are n possible outcomes, xi; i=1,…,n, which are ordered from worst
(i=1) to best (i=n).  Each outcome xi has a known probability pi and the probability of achieving an
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It is assumed that the function q is monotonic with q(0)=0  and q(1)=1.
7  Note that hi(p) is not a
simple transformation of pi, but a function of the cumulative distribution.
8  The transformation
function q(￿) is where the RDEU model generalizes EU analysis.  If q(p)=p, then the RDEU is
equivalent to EU.  Quiggin (1982) proposed an S-shaped function that was generalized by Tversky
and Kahneman (1990) to take the form  ( ) ( ) ( )
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1 p p p p q - = .  Others (e.g., Chew, Karni and
Safra (1987)) have assumed that q would be concave which is a natural extension of the notion of
risk aversion to the RDEU model.  While these representations add significant nonlinear complexity
to the specification of an individual's preferences, they typically involve only one parameter more
than the EU model.
RDEU can explain much of the evidence that has been generated in experimental studies.
9
Nonetheless, because of its close similarities to the EU model, many of the standard results can be
directly applied even if decision makers are to the RDEU maximizers (e.g., Quiggin 1991).6
Maxmin Expected Utility.  The second model that I will highlight here is the Maxmin Expected
Utility (MMEU) model due to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
10  MMEU, which was developed to
address the Ellsberg paradox, formalizes the criterion of Wald (1950) and is closely related to work
of Arrow and Hurwicz (1972).  Like the SEU model, MMEU does not make immediate assumptions
of probabilities but assumes that individuals derive probabilities based on their personal experience.
The MMEU differs from the SEU in the presentation of the independence axiom and through the
introduction of an axiom of uncertainty aversion.  As a result of these subtle differences, while the
SEU finds that decision makers will act as if they possess a unique probability distribution over the
set of outcomes, p, the MMEU model finds that individuals may make choices based on a non-
unique set of probability distributions, say, C={p}.  For example, in a two-outcome problem, the
MMEU maximizer may believe that the probability of success is between 30 and 40 percent, but he
or she is unable to place a second-order probability ranking over this range of probabilities.  A
decision maker following the MMEU axioms, including uncertainty aversion, would maximize the
minimum expected utility.  In other words, if utility is a function of choices z and the state x with the
set of probabilities C, then z is preferred to z' if
( ) ( ) x U E x U E , ' min , min z z p C p p C p ˛ ˛ ‡ . (4)
where Ep is the expectation based on the probability distribution p˛C.  If C is composed of a single
distribution, then the MMEU criterion coincides with SEU theory.  At the other extreme, if the
decision maker is entirely ignorant of the possible probability distributions, then the criterion
coincides Wald's maximin criterion.
The RDEU and MMEU models for choice under uncertainty are leading  contenders in the
search for improved frameworks for choice under uncertainty.  Still, Harless and Camerer (1994)
conclude that there are still no clear winners -- some theories explain little behavior while others
cannot discriminate between behavior consistent with the model and purely random choices.  While7
the search for improved models will continue, non-EU models are already being found useful in
applied economic analysis and applications in the area of agricultural and resource economics are
abundant.
Non-experimental applications of non-EU models
While much of the impetus for non-EU models has come from the experimental work of
Allais and Ellsberg, many "real-world" phenomena have also lead researchers to seek alternatives to
the EU frameworks.  Behavior inconsistent with the EU has been found in problems including
insurance choices (Kunreuther et al.1977, Hogarth and Kunreuther 1985), tax evasion (Bernasconi
1998), criminal behavior (Neilson and Winter 1997), financial markets (Dow and Werlang 1992;
Mehra and Prescott 1985), and consumer willingness to partake in precautionary saving (Leland
1968).  In each instance, reasonable explanations for apparently irrational choices have been
developed by slightly relaxing the EU axioms.
As an example, consider the problem of insurance choices in the EU framework.  Quiggin
(1993 pp. 80-81) shows that it would never be EU-optimal to purchase full insurance if rates are
actuarially unfair and the utility function is smooth.  Intuitively, this is because, in the neighborhood
of certainty, the EU preferences are risk neutral so that at the limit, agents would prefer to bear some
portion of the risk.  While alternative explanations for observed full-insurance in the market are
possible, Segal and Spivak (1990) show that RDEU preferences can explain the purchase of complete
insurance.  Quiggin (1993) summarizes the result: "even if first order risk aversion [curvature of the
utility function] is too weak to induce the purchase of insurance, second order risk aversion
[curvature of q] may lead to a preference for insurance" (p. 81).  The ability to discriminate between
preferences over the outcomes and preferences over the probabilities in the problem itself, therefore,
can prove useful in understanding observed behavior.8
While many of the inconsistencies between the EU models and observed behavior can be
explained using transactions costs, imperfect information or simply errors in choice, the alternative
provided by the non-EU models should be taken seriously.  I turn now to explore some areas in
agricultural and resource economics that might benefit from this alternative perspective.
The role for non-SEU models in agricultural and resource economics
The standard, if generally unstated, response of economists to evidence against SEU is that
while violations in experimental settings might be common, EU models are satisfactory for purposes
of applied analysis.  In the previous section, I have mentioned a number of problems in which non-
EU models have been applied; these models are beginning to find a significant niche.  In this section
I show that in both positive (i.e., descriptive) and normative (i.e., prescriptive) analysis, agricultural
and resource economics could gain significantly from use and appreciation of non-EU frameworks.
Applications in positive economic analysis.  If real preferences are not consistent with the EU models
then it seems obvious that there would be some room for improving the prediction of our models of
economic choice.  The question is when such improvements warrant the costs.
The experimental evidence offers some guidelines as to circumstances in which non-EU
models will likely be fruitful.  First, when decision makers face small probabilities with large
consequences, evidence suggests that they may not be EU maximizers.  Problems that seem likely to
benefit from non-EU analysis, therefore, include insurance and environmental safety.  Second, it is
clear that risk is not the same as ambiguity; when probability distributions are highly uncertain, we
can expect to find significant divergences from the choices predicted by the SEU model.  Choices
where information is limited such as technology adoption or the valuation of environmental
improvements, therefore, might also benefit from the alternative perspective.
Consider the problem of technology adoption.  It seems likely that individuals choosing to
whether to invest in a new technology are in a situation of ambiguity: decision makers may not be9
able to formulate a precise probability distribution over the possible outcomes.  Evidence of this can
be found in the Saha, Love and Schwart's (1994) study of Texas dairy producers' plans to introduce
bST (bovine somatotropin).  Using a survey conducted in 1992, a year before it was available for
commercial use, they found that, among the farmers who had heard of bST, only 52% planned to
introduce the hormone.  As the authors point out, increased risk aversion alone cannot explain why
some farmers would implement at positive levels while others would choose not to introduce.
Within the SEU framework, farmers that choose to adopt must expect higher returns.  However, it
can be shown that aversion to ambiguity (Dow and Werlang 1992) or uncertainty (Quiggin 1993)
might lead two individuals with identical expectations to differ over their decision whether or not to
adopt.
Understanding the role of ambiguity might also be important in the development of
appropriate policy.  Smith, Desvousges and Payne (1991) found that the framing of information
about radon was a significant determinant in the choices made.  Individuals that received a clear and
straightforward guideline for "safety" were more likely to adopt mitigating strategies than those who
received more complete information about the risks of radon.  This supports the hypothesis that
ambiguity is an important factor in these choices.  Hence, an appreciation of the role of ambiguity
might lead to more effective policies.
It seems unlikely that non-EU models will soon become the standard for positive analysis.
The SEU is quite flexible and virtually all market choices can be seen as consistent with the SEU
hypothesis for the appropriate utility function and subjective probabilities or by introducing other
explanations such transactions costs.  Non-EU models, however, offer a parsimonious structure in
which to describe observed behavior.  Moreover, generalizations may not be so costly.  For example,
the basic theory of the producer under uncertainty seems largely intact under the RDEU model
(Quiggin 1993), and other comparative static results generalize immediately to the RDEU (Quiggin
1991).  As we continue to study choice under uncertainty, it will be useful to recognize that EU and10
SEU are special cases of more general models of choice and, to the extent possible, it should be
stated where generalization is or is not possible.
Applications in normative economic analysis. The EU models are applied in many normative
contexts.  Whether we are referring to a farmer, a consumer or society as a whole, it is commonly
held that the "optimal" policy is that which maximizes the expected net benefits.
There are two fundamental problems with this approach.  First, the true underlying
probability distributions that should be used to take the expectations are usually either unknown or
unknowable (Manski 1996).  As such, most, if not all, policy problems are really cases of ambiguity
and should at least be interpreted within the SEU framework.  However, for the analyst to arrive at a
policy recommendation he or she must possess a probability distribution.  This leads to the common
practice of establishing a probability distribution through the use of auxiliary assumptions.  The
approach of Nordhaus (1994) is representative.  In his analysis of global warming policies, Nordhaus
makes use of a survey of experts.  He then builds a probability distribution over possible outcomes
"assuming that the estimates of the cost function [by the surveyed panel] represent independent
draws from the true distribution"  (p. 151).  However, there is no empirical reason to believe that
experts are random draws from a true distribution (Woodward and Bishop 1997).  Making such an
assumption goes beyond the analyst's role, even from the perspective of the SEU.  This is particularly
problematic if one accepts that society's preferences may be of the MMEU kind.
The second problem with the standard EU approach is that, given that individuals do not
abide by the SEU axioms of rationality, there is some question about whether economists should be
in the business of defining what is meant by rationality.  Economists would be typically be quite
reluctant to judge one person's utility function (i.e., the ordering of his or her choices) as wrong.
However, we have been quite willing to implicitly judge that individuals are irrational in the sense
that they do not abide by Savage's axioms.
11   For example, in evaluating the EPA's superfund11
policies, Viscusi, Hamilton and Dockins (1997) state, "Conservatism in risk regulation is analogous
to ambiguity aversion bias, which is one form of irrationality of choice under uncertainty" (p. 189,
emphasis added).  The rationality or irrationality of choices, however, is a function only of the
axioms that one adopts.  While EU and SEU preferences are reasonable, economists should be more
circumspect in passing judgment over what is and what is not rational.  This is not to say that we
should withhold all judgment on policies regardless of how conservative; Viscusi and his colleagues
provide objective reasons why extreme conservatism can make for bad policy (see also Viscusi
1996).  Nonetheless, policies should not be deemed bad or irrational simply because policy makers
seem to be acting in a manner that is inconsistent with EU models.
Summary and conclusions
There were two fundamental points in this paper.  The first is to highlight the evidence that
decision makers frequently violate the axioms of the expected utility and subjective expected utility
hypotheses.  The evidence is clear -- the SEU hypothesis is not a complete model of how choices are
made by humans.  This then begs the question, "Should we care?"  Here consensus has not yet been
reached but it appears to be growing (Fishburn 1988).  For positive analysis, alternatives to the EU
models are being applied to a variety of problems to explain market choices.  Agricultural and
resource economists should begin to pay attention to these alternative choice models and explore the
extent to which they improve our analysis.  Not until the frameworks are suitably tested will a winner
or winners emerge from the pack of models.
In normative analysis, I believe that we have much to learn from the non-EU models.
Evidence points to a role for instruction and a role for directly addressing ambiguity.  For policies in
the environmental arena, the problem of ambiguity is central and our normative analysis should
appreciate its importance.  As Faucheux and Froger (1995, p. 31) point out, "global environmental
problems have no historical precedents. … This means that the information on which decisions are12
made is most often a non-probabilistic kind."  As economists enter into these policy debates,
therefore, we should keep in mind that our recommendations are only as correct as the axiomatic
foundation of the underlying decision model (Woodward and Bishop 1997).
Daniel Bernoulli's solved the St. Petersburg paradox by inventing expected utility.  Today we
look with puzzlement at the response of Daniel's cousin Nicholas Bernoulli who continued to look in
vain for a single fair price for the game based on its expected value.  After retelling this story,
Harless, and Camerer (1994) ask, "Might future economists find it [equally] peculiar that twentieth
century economists held firmly to EU in the face of the Allais paradox and other violations?" (p.
1284).  Proven alternatives to the EU models are available.  Agricultural and resource economists
should begin to pay attention to these models to discover how they will improve our analysis.
Endnotes
1 Discussions with Antony Scott and his extensive comments of and were extremely valuable in the
preparation of this paper.
2 See Anand (1993) for a review.
3 What I am calling ambiguity here is sometimes referred to as uncertainty or Knightian Uncertainty
(after Frank Knight, 1921) as opposed to risk.
4 Anand (1993) provides a good overview of the experimental work, breaking it down significantly
more than I have here.  Harless and Camerer (1994) survey and synthesize the experimental evidence
related to Allais-type behavior and Camerer and Weber (1992) review the studies that have addressed
Ellsberg-type behavior and ambiguity.
5 Readers are referred to Kelsey and Quiggin (1992), Camerer and Weber (1992), Quiggin (1993)
and Harless and Camerer (1994) for much broader reviews of the literature and perspectives on the
relative utility of different models.
6 The RDEU model has, however, also been applied to conditions of ambiguity by Segal (1987), who
uses the RDEU to apply to second-order probability distributions.  Similarly, the model is quite
similar to the models of Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987) that axiomatize a model that uses
Choquet integration when decision makers are faced with ambiguity.
7 The assumption that q(1)=1 is relaxed by Dow and Werlang (1992) to address the issue of
ambiguity.13
                                                                                                                                                                   
8 This property is what guarantees that the stochastic dominance is satisfied and is roughly equivalent
to Choquet integration that has been axiomatically derived by Schmeidler (1989).
9 Harless and Camerer (1994) point out, however, that compared to other models, the RDEU
framework is not very discriminating so that tests of the model have relatively low power.
10 A similar framework has also been proposed by Kelsey (1993).
11 The SEU model has been bolstered by de Finetti's (1974, chapter 3) result that unless an agent used
SEU model, he or she could be systematically robbed of his or her money via a process known as a
Dutch book. However, Machina (1989) showed that these arguments are not applicable to models
that address the Allais paradox and Kelsey (1995) has questioned the practical relevance of these
concerns with regard to MMEU since the developer of such a lottery would require detailed
information about the decision maker.14
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